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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FRIENDSHIP l\IANOR CORPORATION, a Utah non-profit and
drnritable corporation,

Plaintiff Respondent,

-vs-

THE TAX COMMISSION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH; EARL M.
BAKER, Salt Lake County Assessor;
SID LAMBOURNE, Salt Lake
County Treasurer; ROYAL K.
HUNT, OSCAR HANSON, JR., and
PHILLIP BLOMQUIST, Commissioners of Salt Lake County,
Utah; and GLEN PALMER, Salt
Lake County Auditor,

Case No.
12145

Defcnda11ts and Appellants.

nrrAH ODD FELLOWS HOUSING,
INC. a corporatioP

Intervenor,

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
This is an action for declaratory judgment that
plaintiff's lot and building located at 1320 East Fifth
Salt Lake City, Utah, known as Friendship Man1

or, is being used exclusively for charitable purposes
within the meaning of Article XIII, Section 2, Utah Constitution and Section 59-2-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953
'
so as to be exempt from ad valorem tax.
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
After a trial, the court entered a memorandum decision that while the Tax Commission did not exceed its
authority in ordering the Salt Lake County Assessor to
place Friendship Manor on the tax rolls, the Manor (except for some apartments subject to separate assessment) was used exclusively for charitable purposes and
was exempt from the ad valorem tax. Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Judgment were entered accordingly. By the judgment, defendants were ordered to
assess and tax for the years 1968 and 1969 only those
apartments occupied solely by persons under sixty-two
years of age, not handicapped and not employed by plaintiff to assist in the management and operation of Friendship Manor.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Affirmance of the judgment determining that plaintiff's property is being used exclusively for charitable
purposes and ordering the ad valorem tax to be assessed
only on those apartments occupied solely by persons under sixty-two years of age, not handicapped and not employed by Friendship Manor.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The intervenor herein represents to this honorable
court that it is a nonprofit organization formed by the
Home Board of the International Order of Odd Fellows
of Utah for the purpose of providing housing for the elderly on a nonprofit basis with articles of incorporation
practically identical as to substance with ,the plaintiff respondent herein. Intervenor constructed a housing project
of 136 units for this purpose in Ogden, Utah, by use of a
loan from the Department of Housing and Urban Development of $1,850,000.00. During 1967, the Weber County
Attorney requested an opinion from the Attorney General of the State of Utah and said opinion (No. 67-061) was
rendered on the 18th day of August, 1967, saying that intervenor was entitled to be exempt from ad valorem
property taxation by reason of its property being used
for charitable purposes. On December 12, 1967, the WebPr County Commission removed the property of intervenor from the tax rolls of \V eber County; but on December 21, 1967, said action was rescinded, and the property
of intervenor was taxed and ever since that time has been
taxed. The property taxes have been paid under protest
and snit has been filed in the District Court of Weber
County against Weber County, its assessor and the State
of Utah for the return of said monies and for a declaratory judgment that intervenor's property is exempt as
property used for a charitable purpose under the constitution of Utah and the Utah Code Annotated. Said lawis now pending, awaiting the outcome of the instant
appeal in this case.
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Intervenor adopts the statement of facts of the respondent as properly reflecting the facts before the
court, and in view of the arguments of appellant as to
"luxury apartments" fee]sconstrained to assert that intervenor's facility is not a "luxury apartment". Its units
rent for an average of $100.00 per month per unit and are
rented to persons over age of sixty-two and having under
$4,800.00 annual income.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY
(EXCEPT THOSE APARTMENTS OCCUPIED SOLELY BY PERSONS UNDER SIXTY-TWO YEARS OF
AGE, WHO ARE NOT HANDICAPPED) IS USED
EXCLUSIVELY FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES
AND QUALIFIES FOR EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION UNDER AND BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE XIII
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF
UTAH, AND SECTION 59-2-1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED.

The Constitution of the State of Utah recognized the
importance of educational, religious and charitablP institutions by allowing a specific exemption for such organizations from ad valorem property tax:
. . . The property of the state, counties, cities,
towns, school districts, municipal corporations
and public libraries, lots with the buildings thereon used exclusively for either religious worship or
charitable purposes, ... shall be exempt from taxation. . .. Utah Constitution, Article XIII, Section 2.
4

The Utah Cod(• Annotated similarly provides:
"The property of the United States, of this
state, counties, cities, tmn1S,
districts, municipal corporations and pu111ic libraries, lots with
the buildings thereon used exclusively for either
religious worship or charitable purposes, ... shall
he exempt from taxation." Utah
Annotated
1953, as amendl::'d. Section 59-2-1.
.J ndicial interpretation of the breadth of this type of
<>xemption and the essential guidelines and tests to be
met can he found in our own Utah case law. In the case
of Session v. Th01nas Dee Mcnwrial Hospital Assn., 89
Ptah 222, 51 P.2d 229 (1935), the Supreme Court of
Utah laid down guidelines for consideration in determining whether or not the Thomas Dee Memorial Hospital was a charitable institution and could thus escape
tort liability, and equated the criterion for this determination '"ith the exemption for ad valorem tax. (p. 232)

"The fact that an association is organized with
or without capital stock is a matter of proof, and
as such may weigh for or against its claimed charitable character. . .. So may the manner and
amount of profits or accumulations, if any, and
the purposes and manner of distribution or use
thereof, whether the institution may be privately
owned and the nature of that ownership and use,
the activity engaged in - all are matters of evidence. The use or service to which the institution
devotes its property, and the ultimate ends to be
attained, may be important for consideration.
. . . What the evidence established characterized
the institution. Its character is for determination
from the evidence by the court or by the jury under proper instruction by the court. The under5

lying principles exempting a charitable institution
negligent liability are in the last analysis
srmilar to those exempting such institutions from
taxation."
The court then cited the Utah cases involyjng property tax exemptions for charitable institutions and finally announced the following concise test as being controlling in determining the charitability of an institution.
The principal and distinctive features of a
charitable organization are that it has no capital
stock and no provisions for making dividends or
profits, but derives its funds mainly from public
and private charity, and holds them in trust for
the objects and purposes expressed in its charter.
The structure and purposes of Friendship Manor
comply with the standards laid down by the court. There
was no capital stock and the income and assets of the corporation were to be distributed equally so as not to
inure to the benefit of any individual, but to be shared by
all tenants through reduced monthly charges.
These are the practices that Friendship Manor maintained, and these are the purposes expressly listed in the
articles of incorporation of this charitable institution.
The articles of incorporation also provided that in the
event of winding up or dissolution, donations be made to
other nonprofit charities. These assets would thereby be
pledged to charity in perptuum.
Looking now past the charitable entity and into the
"exclusive use" concept, we again find the decisions of
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the Utah Supreme Court helpful in defining and establishing our guidelines.
An early Utah case is Parker v. Quinn, 23 Utah 332,
64 P.961 (1901). The upper floor of a building owned by
the LDS Relief Society was used by the society for its
mt'etings and work in furtherance of its charitable purposes. The lower floor contained two rooms, one of which
was rented and one which was for rent but vacant. The
county assessor contended that the property was not being used exclusively for charitable purposes because half
"·as rented or available for rent commercially. The court
recognized that the rented portion was not being used for
charitable purposes but held that the assessor should diYide the property for taxation purposes and exempt that
portion which was being so used. The court pointed out
that while the portion may not be separated by definite
lines, this was no obstacle to valuation of such portion
for the purposes of taxation. Because "the relief society
which owns and manages the property over which this
controversy arose was organized and acts exclusively for
charitable purposes," the portion of the building used
rharitably was granted exemption from taxation.

In Salt Lake Lodge No. 85 BPOE v. Groesbeck, 40
Utah 1, 120 P. 192 ( 1911), an action to recover taxes paid
nndH protest, the terms "charitable purpose" and "exclusive I,\·" were considered in a more complex context.
The county assessor held the E1ks Lodge to be subject to
thr ad valorem tax largely because the building was used
for a variety of purposes, including maintenance of a
C'afr ·where liquors, food, refreshments and cigars were
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sold for a profit to its members. The lodge also maintained rooms where billiards and cards were played.
This court again reversed the trial court's denial of a tax
exemption and in doing so aligned itself with those courts
which construe charitable exemptions liberally. The
court said at p. 194:
"The general rule is that when private property is claimed to be exempt from taxation the
law under which the exemption is claimed will be
strictly construed ... There is, however, an exception to this general rule, and statutes exempting property used for educational and charitable
purposes or for public worship, under the great
weight of authority, shoitld receive a broad and
more liberal construction than those exempting
property used iuith the view to gain or profit only.
The reason for the rule is that the state, by exempting property used exclusively for one or
more of the purposes mentioned from taxation,
is presumed to receive benefits from the property
equivalent at least to the public revenue that
would otherwise be derived from it." (Emphasis
added)
Recognizing that the exemption depends upon the
use to which the property itself is devoted, the conrt
nevertheless regarded the character of the organization
as significant where some of the uses of the buildings
were not strictly charitable. It said at p. 197:

"It is a matter of common knowleq,ge that the
charity dispensed by fraternal orders and societies and other like charitable institutions does
not consist alone of the material assistance represented in dollars and cents. They give to the orphan, indigent poor, the sick and afflicted w!to
may be in need of help by furnishing them with
8

food, clothing, shelter and medical aid, but that
they also bestow other kinds of charity which in
many cases are just as essential and just as potent
in their effect for doing good and relieving distress as is the niaterial assistance rendered by
them. We refer to the charity which is an embodinient of sympathy and kindneiis . ., (Emphasis
added)
The court recognizes that charity is not measm·ed in
terms of mere dollars and cents but is a supplying of the
necessary elements in a person's life so that he might enjoy a
rounded and full life. In the Groesbeck case
the court did not concern itself with the food and refresh1m•nts that were being sold at a profit to the members,
hut recognized the important fraternal and social needs
that the Elks Lodge was satisfying in its members.
The third case dealing with the charitable purposes
rxemption is Odd Fellows Building Association v. Naylor, 53 Utah 111, 177 P. 214 (1918). The court, following
the Parker and Groesbeck cases, did not retreat from its
Yiew that charitable exemptions should be liberally constrned.
The Utah case law discussed is very much in point
with the factual setting of the case now before this conrt.
The Parker case indicates that as long as Friendship
:Jianor is organized and functioning as a charitable institution and is using its property primarily for charitable purposes that it is entitled to tax exemption for all
pro1wrty being so used. Under the holding and rule of
th0 Grorsbeck case, it is unimportant that Friendship
:Jlanor receives money for its services to those, in need
9

providing that its primary purpose is to satisfy the very
evident needs of the aged. Social difficulties, boredom,
depression and malnutrition are all problems that were
being solved by Friendship Manor in its efforts to make
elderly people feel like important and wanted persons in
society.
It js evident from Utah case law and the facts of this
case, that there is adequate support for a finding that the
Friendship Manor is engaged in satisfying the needs of
the elderly in our society and should thereby qualify for
tax exemption as a charitable institution.

Recent cases in closely surrounding jurisdictions
have granted tax exemptions to charitable institutions
providing housing for the aged. One of the first cases to
recognize homes for the aged as being charitable was
Fredricka Home and the Aged v. Sain Diego County, 35
Cal. 2d 789, 221 P .2d 68 ( 1950). The California court
considered the taxability of a nonprofit corporation 01Jerating a home for the elderly on a "life-care" contract basis. The primary challenge made by the taxing authority
was that the plaintiff was not a charitable institution because it did not extend free services to the poor. Thr
court said:
" ... the controlling consideration in determining
whether an institution such as plaintiff's should
be classified as a charitable one is not whether a
few or all of the recipients of its benefits may
make reasonable contributions toward def erring
the cost of such benefits, but whether such contributions as are made do not exceed what is required for the maintenance of the institution at a
10

reasonable standard and are devoted to the purposes for which the institution was founded, which
purposes, in the absence of required contributions, would clearly be deemed to be charitable. If
such is the situation then the institution is no less
a charity because of the receipt of such contributions, and within such concept plaintiff properly
claims a tax exempt status under the welfare exemption law."
The essential element granting tax exemption in
California lies in the fact that all money received by the
home for the aged be used in satisfying the needs of the
aged. The facts of our case indicate that no profits were
being siphoned off for individual profit or use, but that
all money received by Friendship Manor was being used
for the necessary services required by the aged persons
living there.
The State of Montana granted tax exemption to a
home for the elderly in Bozeman Deaconess Foundation
r. Ford, 439 P.2d 915 (1968). The facility was one requiring tenants to pay for a life contract and monthly
maintenance charges. The court held:
"To qualify as a charity does not require that
it have an exclusive relationship to the poor, and
its charitable status is not destroyed by the charging of fees for admission and maintenance."
The court also commented on the changing meaning
of "charity" and stated that the law has a much broader
meaning of the word than is accorded it in common
speech. Our Utah courts have also recognized the
broader meaning of "charity" in its past decisions and
11

is in agreement with the position taken by the Montana
court in the Bo.zenian Deaconess case.
The Arizona Supreme Court has also recognized the
charitable nature of care for the elderly. In Memoriul
Hospital v. Sparks, 453 P.2d 989 (1969), they held:
"Senior citizen apartments, which were owned
and operated by hospital to provide low rent
housing and medical care for aged persons and
which were not designed to make a profit, constituted 'charitable institution' within constitutional
and statutory provisions providing property tax
exemption for charitable institutions."
It was also emphasized in the decision that the
exemption was not granted because of the hospital o"·nership of the apartments but because of their mm
inherent charitable characteristics and uses.

The weight of authority from the snrronnding
jurisdictions would have us grant the tax exemption to
Friendship Manor because it is providing housing and
other essential services for our senior citizens which is
recognized as a charitable activity.
\Vith the increased technology in medicine and 1rith
the low<>ring of ages for retirement, our society
being faced with a rising population in elderly people
who have been pushed into a world of unprodnctivr
boredom and depression. It is society's responsihility
to provide solutions to these problems. The Congress
of the United States has made recommendations in t]ll'

White House Conference on Aging Act (P. L. 85-908,
72 Stat. 1746) enacted September 2, 1958.
"We may expect average length of life and the
number of older people to increase still further,
we must proceed with all possible speed to correct
these conditions and to create a social, economic,
and health climate which will permit our middle
aged and older people to continue to lead proud
and independent lives which will restore and rehabilitate many of them to useful and dignified
positions among their neighbors; which will enhance the vigor and vitality of the communities
and of our total economy; and which will prevent
further aggravation of their problems with resulting increased social, financial, and medical
burdens." (Emphasis added)
Congress has recognized the important needs of the
aged and has suggested that action be taken to satisfy
those needs. The Friendship Manor is helping to solve
the problems of the aged by creating a facility where
boredom is nonexistent, where depression is warded off
by activities, where nutrition is constantly watched and
imposed upon the aged, and where all these benefits are
being passed on to the aged at minimal cost.
High rents are not present because of (1) no profits
are realized by Friendship Manor, and (2) property
tax exemptions have been allowed in reducing costs,
and (3) the FHA has helped finance the project on a
long-term low interest loan. If the tax exemption is
not granted rents must rise· with the additional cost
of taxes. In many projects FHA financing will be lost
without the charitable exemption causing higher rents
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to the elderly. With retired people, incomes are usually
fixed and the elderly are not often capable of keeping
up with the fluctuating economy. Actual earnings account
"for as little as thirty-two percent of the aggregate
money income of all person aged sixty-five or over and
their spouses." (Greenfield, Margaret, Property Tax Exemptions for Senior Citizens, 1966, pg. 5.) It is an
unthankful society that will push their parents into the
financial squeeze of old age without providing for their
needs.
Defendants argue that there are other homes for
the aged that presently operate in a similar manner to
Friendship Manor without the tax exemption. Intervenor does not deny that other people have recognized
the social and psychological needs of the aged and set
out to help solve these problems. It is recognized that
caring for the elderly can be a very lucrative business.
However, Friendship Manor and the intervenor han•
chosen to operate as nonprofit organizations with the
assets thereof going to charity if they are eiver sold, a
use certainly within the Groesbeck rule. It is common
knowledge that the operators of the Newhouse Hotel
took over a receivership of a hotel in financial difficulty.
Perhaps the price paid for this older structure allows
the operators to make a profit, and, if the value of the
property goes up, they can sell it for a profit, which
cannot be done in the case of Friendship Manor or the
jntervenor.
Defendants argue that if this court should uphold
the trial court's findings, that nothing would stop indi-
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--viduals from forming nonprofit corporations for housing
affluent individuals. Such a case is not before this
court, and, if and when it does come before this court,
a ruling can be made as to the matter therein presented.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN APPORTIONING THE TAX EXEMPTION TO THOSE
PORTIONS OF THE PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY
THAT QUALIFY AS BEING EXCLUSIVELY USED
FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES.

The Supreme Court of Utah m Parker v. Quinn,
supra., established an equitable method of taxing property that might have both charitable and non-charitable
uses. The court said:
""Where, therefore, as in this case, a portion
of certain property owned by a charitable institution is occupied and used by it for charitable
purposes, and the other portion thereof is devoted to purposes of revenue, the portion used
and occupied for charitable purposes is exempt,
and the portion not so used and occupied is subject to taxation."

*

*

*

"We think, however, that the weight of authority is in harmony with the rule above stated, and
that the disposition of this case in accordance
therewith is equitable and just."
The court held that apportioning the tax exemption
was fair and equitable and that it should be implemented
even in cases where separating the exempt and nonexempt portions may not physically be separable.
"The fact that the building is so constnlCted
that the parts leased or otherwise used with a

15

view to profit cannot be separated from the residue by definite lines is no obstacle to a valuation
of such parts for purpose of taxation, having
due reference to the taxable value of the entire
property."
This position taken in Parker received support from
later decisions from this same court. In Odd F elloics
Building Association v. Naylor, supra., the lower floor
of the plaintiff's property was being rented to stores.
The court quoted the Parker case and used the apportionment theory to assess taxes against the rented portions of the plaintiff's property and grant exemption
to the charitable portions of the building. Reasoning
from other jurisdictions was ignored in preference for
the Parker rule.
Other jurisdictions have quoted and followed the
Parker case. Of particular interest is a case from the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma. In Oklahornct Coimty r.
Queen City Lodge No. 197, I. 0. 0. F., 195 Okla. 1131, 15G
P. 2d 340 (1945), a lodge of a fraternal order was being
used for some charitable and non-charitable purpose::;.
A long list of arnici curiae filed briefs in the interest
of the outcome of the case. The court quoted at great
length from the Parker case and accepted the rule
announced therein as controlling. They also made the rule
effective retroactively on former decisions of the conrt.
Intervenor feels that the rule announced in Parker
is sound, equitable and just. It has received support
from several more recent cases in this and other jurisdictions. It should not be abandoned now where fairness
would dictate its application.
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CONCLUSION
The property of the plaintiff fits within the judicially defined boundaries of the tax exemption for exclusive charitable use. The needs of the elderly can be met
by allowing homes for aged like Friendship Manor to
exist under a tax exempt status. The trial court was
correct in holding that providing suitable housing for
the elderly is charitable, and it is proper to assess separately those portions of the building which might be
used for persons other than elderly, and the order of
the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN L. McCOY
BARKER, RYBERG & McCOY
325 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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